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How to Get Away with Murder:  Criminal and Civil Immunity Provisions in “Stand Your 
Ground” Legislation 
Jennifer Randolph* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
At approximately seven p.m. on February 26, 2012, seventeen-year old Trayvon Martin 
was shot and killed in an Orlando-area neighborhood by neighborhood watch leader George 
Zimmerman.
1
  While the events that triggered the shooting are clouded in controversy, it remains 
uncontested that Martin was unarmed and on his return from the local convenience store.
2
  
Though Zimmerman admitted to firing the shot that killed Martin, he asserted that it was done in 
self-defense.
3
  Zimmerman was neither immediately arrested nor charged after the incident.
4
  In 
the months that followed, the case gained national attention
5
 and placed Florida’s “Stand Your 
Ground” law under scrutiny.  In particular, the initial decision by police not to arrest Zimmerman 
sparked protest from both the public
6
 and the Martin family.
7
  Sanford Police Chief Bill Lee 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, 2014 Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., The College of New Jersey.  Special thanks to 
Professor John Kip Cornwell for his guidance throughout this writing of this Comment. 
1
 Julia Dahl, The Trayvon Martin Case Exposes the Realities of a New Generation of Self-Defense Laws, CBSNEWS 
(Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57398005-504083/the-trayvon-martin-case-exposes-
the-realities-of-a-new-generation-of-self-defense-laws/. 
2
 Id. The facts surrounding the incident are not completely clear.  Zimmerman called 911 to report a “real suspicious 
black guy” in the neighborhood.  Though the 911 operator told Zimmerman not to chase after Martin, Zimmerman 
followed the seventeen-year-old and an altercation ensued.  Zimmerman states that Martin knocked him to the 
ground with a punch to the nose, smashed his head into the ground, and attempted to take his gun.  On April 11, 
2012, Zimmerman was ultimately charged with second-degree murder and a lesser offense of manslaughter.  See 
The Travvon Martin Case:  A Timeline, THE WEEK (Jul. 17, 2012), http://theweek.com/article/index/226211/the-
trayvon-martin-case-a-timeline [hereinafter Timeline].  Interestingly, Zimmerman chose not to assert immunity 
under Florida law, but, instead, to rely on the affirmative defense of self-defense.  Seni Tienabeso & Matt Guttman, 
George Zimmerman’s Decision Leads to Summer Trial, ABCNEWS (Apr. 30, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmerman-waives-stand-ground-hearing-heads-trial/story?id=19074241. 
Following a jury trial, Zimmerman was acquitted.  Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman is Acquitted in 
Trayvon Martin Killing, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2013, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-trayvon-martin.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
3
 Dahl, supra note 1.  
4
 Id. 
5
 In April of 2012 30% of Americans indicated they were following the Trayvon Martin case more than any other 
story.  Timeline, supra note 3. 
6
 See Patrik Jonsson, Trayvon Martin Case Reveals Confusion Over How Stand Your Ground Works. THE 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2012/0411/Trayvon-Martin-
case-reveals-confusion-over-how-Stand-Your-Ground-works. 
7
 See Timeline, supra note 3. 
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stated in a press conference on March 12, 2012, “[i]n this case Mr. Zimmerman has made the 
statement of self-defense . . . .Until we can establish probable cause to dispute that, we don’t 
have the grounds to arrest him.”8  This statement reflects the implications of an immunity 
provision passed in 2005 as a part of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground Law.”9  Since 2005, upwards 
of 20 states have passed similar “Stand Your Ground” statutes containing provisions for criminal 
immunity, civil immunity, or both for persons “justified” in using force.10  
This Comment does not begin with the story of Trayvon Martin to incite discussion on 
the outcome of the case, or to proffer an opinion regarding the veracity of Zimmerman’s defense, 
but to serve as an instructive starting point demonstrating the implications of one type of 
immunity now granted to many defendants asserting a claim of self-defense.  The goal of this 
Comment is to explore the various types of immunity granted by recent “Stand Your Ground” 
laws, to highlight the problematic aspects of these provisions, and to recommend change for the 
legislation.  Part II of this article provides a background to self-defense law and examples of how 
previous immunity provisions functioned.  Next, the article focuses on the new “Stand Your 
Ground” laws and how the addition of civil and criminal immunity changed traditional self-
                                                          
8
 See Dahl, supra note 1.  The police chief later stepped down following a “vote of no-confidence from the city.” 
Cora Currier, The 24 States That Have Sweeping Self-Defense Laws Just Like Florida’s, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 22, 
2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-23-states-that-have-sweeping-self-defense-laws-just-like-floridas. 
9
 See FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (West 2013). 
10
 See Wyatt Holliday, Comment, “The Answer to Criminal Aggression is Retaliation:” Stand Your Ground Laws 
and the Liberalization of Self-Defense, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 407, 407 (2012); P. Luevonda Ross, The 
Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle Association-Inspired Statutes:  From the Doctrine of Retreat to 
the Right to Stand Your Ground, 35 S.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(d) (2012); ALASKA 
STAT. ANN. § 09.65.330 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (West 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 
2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.085 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:2800.19 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922b (West 2012); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-15(5)(b) 
(West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.074 (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:1-a (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-51.2(e) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-05-07.2 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2307.60(2)(B)(c) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (West 2012); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
8340.2 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-450 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-22(d) (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
895.62(2) (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-204 (West 2012).   Though additional states have amended their 
self-defense statutes to reflect traditional aspects of “Stand Your Ground” legislation, the previous list reflects those 
that have added some form of immunity provision since the enactment of the Florida statute in 2005.  The specific 
aspects of these state laws will be discussed in the sections that follow.  
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defense procedures and law.  Part IV focuses on laws granting criminal immunity and highlights 
problematic aspects of their implementation.  Part V focuses on statutes granting civil immunity 
and their possible implications.  Then, Part VI makes recommendations for change or 
amendment to these statutes.  Finally, Part VII concludes. 
II. Self-Defense and Immunity Provisions Before 2005 
 
 A typical “Stand Your Ground” law is a doctrine of self-defense that allows a person to 
meet force, including deadly force, with corresponding force.
11
  These laws traditionally 
eliminate any existing duty to retreat and provide for some form of criminal or tort immunity.
12
  
These laws are premised on, and justified by, the idea that a law-abiding citizen should be 
permitted to “protect themselves, their families, and others from intruders and attackers without 
fear of prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of themselves and others.”13  This section 
looks at traditional self-defense law and immunity provisions, while the subsequent sections 
detail how immunity provisions in “Stand Your Ground” laws have altered the “traditional” both 
substantively and procedurally.  Substantively, the “Stand Your Ground” laws have expanded 
state self-defense law by both removing the duty to retreat, in those states that retain it
14
 and 
adding a presumption of reasonable force when the force is used in the home or car.
15
  
Procedurally, the new “Stand Your Ground” laws generally prohibit arrest without probable 
                                                          
11
 See generally Andrea A. Amoa, Note and Comment, Texas Issues a Formidable License to Kill:  A Critical 
Analysis of the Joe Horn Shootings and the Castle Doctrine, 33 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 293, 297–98 (2008) 
(describing Texas’ “Stand Your Ground” law); Jason W. Bobo, Comment, Following the Trend:  Alabama 
Abandons the Duty to Retreat and Encourages Citizens to Stand Their Ground, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 339, 361–63 
(2008) (describing Alabama’s “Stand Your Ground” law); Wyatt Holliday, Comment, “The Answer to Criminal 
Aggression is Retaliation:” Stand-Your Ground Laws and the Liberalization of Self-Defense, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 
407, 425–28, 431–33 (2012) (describing Ohio’s and Wisconsin’s  “Stand Your Ground” laws); Judith Koons, 
Gunsmoke and Legal Mirrors:  Women Surviving Intimate Battery and Deadly Legal Doctrines, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 
617, 618 n.3 (2006) (describing Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law). 
12
 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (West 2012). 
13
 See Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (quoting the preamble to § 776.032 of the Florida statutes); 
David Kopel, Florida’s New Self Defense Law, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 19, 2005, 11:24 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1116516262.shtml. 
14
 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2012).  See generally  text accompanying notes 116–122. 
15
 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2012).  See generally  text accompanying notes 116–122. 
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cause that unlawful force was used,
16
 permit pre-trial immunity hearings for persons asserting 
self-defense,
17
 and prevent remedies in the civil courts when a person asserts statutory 
immunity.
18
  
A. Self-Defense:  Substance, Procedure, and Theory 
 
“Every state in the United States recognizes a defense for the use of force, including 
deadly force, in self-protection.”19  In 1806, one of the first self-defense cases was considered by 
an American court.
20
  In Commonwealth v. Selfridge, the defendant, Selfridge, was charged with 
manslaughter for the death of Charles Austin, a young Harvard student.
21
  In his jury instruction, 
Judge Parker articulated the basic concept of self-defense, “[w]hen . . . there is reasonable 
ground to believe that there is a design to destroy his life . . . then killing the assailant will be 
excusable . . . although it should afterwards appear that no felony was intended . . . .”22  Judge 
Parker went on to proffer a hypothetical in which the defendant (“A”) is faced with an 
opponent/victim waving a gun.
23
  In the hypothetical, the defendant kills the victim only to later 
find out that the gun contained blanks instead of bullets.
24
  Judge Parker questioned, “Will any 
reasonable man say that A is more criminal than he would have been if there had been a bullet in 
the pistol?”25  Though both the instruction and the hypothetical offered by Judge Parker have 
                                                          
16
 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012). 
17
 See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29–30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
18 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. 
& REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012). 
19
 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 223 (5th ed. 2009). 
20
 Ross, supra note 10, at 6. 
21
 Id. Selfridge, a lawyer and aspiring politician, had squabbled with the victim’s father, Benjamin Austin, over the 
posting of slanderous comments about him in the local newspaper.  Id.  Following these comments, the situation 
intensified and Selfridge armed himself.  Id.  Selfridge was met with the younger Austin on the street and in 
possession of a cane; an altercation ensued resulting in the death of Charles Austin by the gun of Selfridge. Id. 
22
 Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea:  II-Honest But Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self-Defense, 28 
B.C. L. REV. 459, 477 (1987). 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Id.  
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been criticized as “off-point”26 in the context of the Selfridge fact-pattern, the ideas represented 
by this decision remain a part of American self-defense law.
27
 
Traditionally, a person was justified in his or her use of force if he or she reasonably 
believed that force was necessary to prevent the imminent use of unlawful force against him or 
her by another.
28
   With this standard, a person need not experience actual harm so long as he 
possessed a reasonable belief that such harm was imminent.
29
  Deadly force was permitted only 
in situations where the actor had a reasonable belief that he was facing the imminent use of 
unlawful deadly force.
30
  In both instances the defense was qualified by the requirement that the 
person asserting the defense be a “non-aggressor” in the altercation that gave rise to the use of 
force.
31
  
Generally, a person who claims self-defense raises an affirmative defense, arguing that 
the use of force was justified, in either a criminal or civil proceeding.
32
  For the most part, there 
is no substantive difference between the assertion of self-defense in a criminal matter and a civil 
or tort matter; therefore, the previous discussion reflects the construct of the defense in either 
                                                          
26
 Singer opines that because Selfridge’s indictment was for manslaughter, not murder, and his shot was unlikely to 
have been the result of a “mistake” as to the amount of force necessary, the fact-pattern of Selfridge is not ideal for a 
discussion of self-defense.  See id. 
27
 See State v. Light, 664 S.E.2d 465, 469 (S.C. 2008) (holding that a defendant was entitled to an instruction of self-
defense when he was approached with a firearm); Koritta v. State, 438 S.E.2d 68, 69–70 (Ga. 1994) (holding that the 
defendant was entitled to a self-defense instruction in an altercation involving a gun). 
28
 DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 223. 
29
 See Lydia Zbrzenj, Note, Florida’s Controversial Gun Policy:  Liberally Permitting Citizens to Arm Themselves 
and Broadly Recognizing the Right to Act in Self-Defense, 13 F. COASTAL. L. REV. 231, 233 (2012). 
30
 DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 223 (emphasis in original). 
31
 Id. at 226 (defining aggressor as “one who threatens unlawfully to commit a battery upon another or who 
provokes a physical conflict by words or actions calculated to bring about an assault”). 
32
 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1416 (West 2012).  This statute exemplifies this statement.  In subsection 
(1) of the statute it provides that “In any prosecution based on conduct which is justifiable under sections 28-1406 to 
28-1416, justification is an affirmative defense.” Id. at § 28-1416(1). In subsection (2) of the statute, it 
acknowledges the same range of sections and provides that they serve as an affirmative defense to a civil action as 
well. Id. at § 28-1416(2).  Within the range of applicable sections is the justification for the use of force.  See id. at § 
28-1409.   
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situation.
33
  The most critical procedural difference is in the burden placed upon both the 
plaintiff/prosecutor and the defendant in either situation.
34
  In a criminal matter, the prosecution 
bears the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.35  States differ, 
however, on the burden of proof that is placed on the defendant with respect to an affirmative 
defense.
36
  Comparatively, in a civil matter, the burden of both pleading and proving self-defense 
is on the defendant who seeks to justify his or her actions.
37
  This must be done by a 
preponderance of the evidence.
38
  No matter where the burden lies in various states, however, the 
ultimate decision traditionally rested in the hands of the judge or jury deciding the matter at 
trial.
39
   
Traditionally, the recognition of self-defense as an affirmative defense rested on the 
premise that certain actions are “justified” by their circumstances.40  “Justification” defenses 
typically provide protection for actions that are considered warranted by the situation.
41
  For 
example, a driver of a fire engine may speed en route to an emergency, in violation of local 
                                                          
33
 Caroline Forell, Symposium, Who is the Reasonable Person?  What’s Reasonable?:  Self-Defense and Mistake in 
Criminal and Tort Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1403 (2010); see also 33 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 
Privileged Use of Force in Self-Defense § 1 (2012) [hereinafter Privileged Use of Force] (“There are few, if any, 
substantive distinctions between civil and criminal law with regard to the prerequisites to justification of a claim of 
self-defense, and, with the exception of the rule of evidence which gives to a person accused of a crime the benefit 
of a reasonable doubt the law of self-defense is the same in both criminal and civil cases.”); supra text 
accompanying notes 19–31 (describing the substance of self-defense law). 
34
 See Privileged Use of Force, supra note 33, at § 1. 
35
 See id. at § 7; Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 
458 (1989) (“In the criminal trial setting, the presumption of innocence is given vitality primarily through the 
requirement that the government prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
36
 See Privileged Use of Force, supra note 33, at § 7.  In some states, the defendant is required to prove that he acted 
in self-defense “either by a preponderance of the evidence, by the greater weight of the evidence, by convincing 
evidence, by proof to the satisfaction of the jury, or by proof raising a reasonable doubt.”  Id.  Other states leave the 
burden on the prosecutor to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was not acting in self-defense.  Id.  
States may also require that the defendant produce evidence that he or she acted in self-defense and leave the burden 
of persuasion on the prosecution.  Id. 
37
 Id. at § 8. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Elizabeth Cateforis, Self-Defense, What’s a Jury Got To Do With It?, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1143, 1153 (2009).  This is one aspect of self-defense law that is altered significantly by the new legislation; see 
infra Part III. 
40
 See Marcia Baron, Justifications and Excuses, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 387, 388–89 (2005); Zbrzenj, supra note 22, 
at 234. 
41
 Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1900 (1984). 
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traffic laws; however, the driver’s behavior would be considered warranted because the risk of 
harm associated with the fire is greater than the traffic risk created by the truck’s speed.42  
Members of society would not only accept the driver’s actions, but they would hope that drivers 
in that same position would take the same action.
43
  By contrast, defenses such as insanity are 
considered “excuse” defenses.44   “Excuse” defenses relieve the individual actor of blame for 
their actions; here the same actions would not be excused for other persons.
45
  For example, an 
employee who has extreme mental and emotional issues, flies into a fit of rage, and hits a co-
worker may be wholly or partially excused from liability because of his or her diminished mental 
state.
46
  The same strike by any other person, however, would not receive protection.
47
   
This categorization not only draws distinction by title, it reflects a distinction in moral 
principles as well.
48
  “[T]o say that an action is justified is to say . . . that though the action is of a 
type that is usually wrong, in these circumstances it was not wrong.  To say that an action is 
excused, by contrast, is to say that it was indeed wrong . . . but the agent is not blameworthy.”49  
Taking this one step further, one scholar opines that the policy justifying self-defense is the very 
same which underlies the creation of the crimes it serves as a defense to, i.e. offenses against the 
person such as murder, battery or rape.
50
  Specifically, it is the societal interest in life and bodily 
integrity that is paramount to the justification of self-defense and to the creation of crimes which 
                                                          
42
 Id. at 1899. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Baron, supra note 40, at 388–89 (noting also that “some defenses are difficult to classify”). 
45
 Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 1900. 
46
 Id. at 1899–1900. 
47
 Id. at 1900. 
48
 Baron, supra note 40, at 389.  Baron acknowledges that most persons would prefer to have an action deemed 
justified versus excused.  Id. 
49
 See id. at 388–90. 
50
 Janine Young Kim, Rule and Exception in Criminal Law (Or, Are Criminal Defenses Necessary?), 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 247, 278 (2007). 
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intend to prohibit harmful use of force.
51
  This same respect for human life is diminished under 
new “Stand Your Ground” laws that permit complete immunity from criminal or civil action. 
B. Self-Defense:  Deadly Force and the Duty to Retreat 
Recognizing the value of human life, English common law embraced a duty to retreat “as 
far as he conveniently or safely can” when in the face of deadly force.52  This duty reflected a 
historical reluctance to legitimize the right of self-defense when it involved defensive killing.
53
  
An exception to the duty to retreat existed, however, when a man was attacked in his own 
home.
54
  Reflecting the conviction that “a man’s home is his castle,” this exception became 
known as the Castle Doctrine.
55
  Therefore, a man faced with deadly force in his own home had 
no duty to retreat to safety before responding with force, including deadly force.
56
   
Beginning in the nineteenth century, there was a dramatic movement in the United States 
to abandon the duty to retreat in the face of deadly force.
57
  Resentment towards the duty to 
retreat grew as a result of the view that to require such a duty was to require cowardice.
58
  Thus, 
a majority of modern American self-defense statutes utilize a “no retreat” rule that permits a non-
aggressor to utilize deadly force in the face of an unlawful deadly attack, even if retreat to safety 
is possible.
59
  The minority of states that maintain the duty to retreat in the face of deadly force, 
                                                          
51
 Id. 
52
 See Bobo, supra note 11, at 362; Benjamin Levin, Note, A Defensible Defense?:  Reexamining Castle Doctrine 
Statutes, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 528 (2010) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 423). 
53
 See Levin, supra note 52, at 528. 
54
 Id. at 530. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Levin, supra note 52, at 529. 
58
 Bobo, supra note 11, at 343; see also Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground:  Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the 
Twenty-First Century, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 504, 507 (2007) (“The American ideals of bravery and honor 
suited themselves to frontier life in a way that the English duty to retreat could not.”). 
59
 See Bobo, supra note 52, at 343; DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 229. 
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however, continue to embrace the English common law Castle Doctrine exception.
60
  The Model 
Penal Code, for example, states that an “actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place 
of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by another person 
whose place of work the actor knows it to be.”61  The Castle Doctrine acknowledges the idea that 
the home is a sanctuary from which a person should not be forced to flee in the face of a threat 
serious bodily injury or death.
62
   
Abrogation of the duty to retreat became evident first in the state supreme courts.
63
  In 
Erwin v. State, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a “true man” should not be 
required to retreat from an “assailant, who . . . maliciously seeks to take his life.”64  Similarly, in 
Runyan v. State the Indiana Supreme Court found that the “American mind” weighed against 
imposing a duty to retreat.
65
  The Supreme Court followed suit, essentially rejecting the duty to 
retreat in the 1921 case Brown v. United States.
66
  In Brown, the defendant was convicted of the 
murder of Hermis, a man who was reportedly attacking the defendant with a knife at the time 
that he fired the fatal shot.
67
  Though it was requested by the defense, the lower court refused to 
give a jury instruction that retreat was unnecessary if the defendant reasonably feared for his 
                                                          
60
 Id. at 531; see also People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914) (“It is not now and never has been the law 
that a man assailed in his own dwelling is bound to retreat.”); State v. Middleham, 17 N.W. 446, 448 (Iowa 1883) 
(stating that there is no duty to retreat in one’s home). 
61
 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(1) (Official Draft 1985). 
62
 See Zbrzenj, supra note 29, at 238–39. 
63
 Bobo, supra note 11, at 344; see, e.g., Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80 (1877); Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (Ohio 
1876). 
64
 Erwin, 29 Ohio St. at 199.  In Erwin, the defendant and his son-in-law were in a dispute over the possession of a 
storage shed that was located in-between their two homes.  The day that the homicide took place, Erwin was in the 
shed and his son-in-law approached him with an ax in an apparently threatening manner.  Erwin responded with a 
single shot that resulted in the death of his son-in-law.  Id. at 192–93. 
65
 Runyan, 57 Ind. at 84.  Runyan was convicted of manslaughter of Charles Pressnal.  The deceased hit him two or 
three times before Runyan pulled a pistol out of his pocket and shot him. Id at 81. 
66
 256 U.S. 335 (1921); see also Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 563–64 (1895) (holding that there is no duty 
to retreat when a person is on the premises of their dwelling and faced with deadly force). 
67
 Brown, 256 U.S. at 341–42.  
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life.
68
  Instead, the court instructed the jury that the defendant had a duty to retreat.
69
  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari
70
 and Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the Court, 
stated:  
Many respectable writers agree that if a man reasonably believes 
that he is in immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm 
from his assailant he may stand his ground and that if he kills him 
he has not exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defense . . . 
Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an 
uplifted knife. Therefore in this Court, at least, it is not a condition 
of immunity that one in that situation should pause to consider 
whether a reasonable man might not think it possible to fly with 
safety or to disable his assailant rather than to kill him.
71 
 
Justice Holmes’ opinion not only gives credence to the abolition of the duty to retreat in the face 
of deadly force in American jurisdictions, but it also highlights the beginnings of the ideas 
underlying “Stand Your Ground” legislation.72  The use of the term “immunity” in this opinion, 
however, does not reflect its use in the new legislation.
73
     
C. Immunity: Public Officials and Self-Defense 
Immunity, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, is “any exemption from a duty, liability 
or service of process.”74 Traditionally, immunity for an individual defendant has been based 
                                                          
68
 Id. at 342. 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. at 341. 
71
 Id. at 343. (emphasis added).  It is interesting to highlight within this description the use of “stand his ground” and 
“immunity.”   
72
 See generally Christine Cantalfamo, Note, Stand Your Ground:  Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-First 
Century, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 504, 509 (2007) (noting that an “increased understanding of human nature 
and the complex moral measurements required by the duty to retreat” lead to the privilege of non-retreat and that 
this realization was evident in the Holmes opinion).  The Brown decision serves as persuasive authority for those 
states dealing with issues of the duty to retreat in self-defense law.  See Bobo, supra note 11, at 351.  It follows that 
it also serves some persuasive authority for the “Stand Your Ground” laws. 
73
 See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (holding that the Florida law entitled a defendant to a 
pretrial hearing regarding immunity from prosecution for lawful use of force, not merely an affirmative defense of 
self-defense at trial). 
74
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 817 (9th ed. 2009). 
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upon his or her status as a public official.
75
  The recent “Stand Your Ground” legislation, 
however, grants immunity to defendants who are justified in their use of force.
76
    To distinguish 
between the concept of an affirmative defense, like self-defense, and the concept of “immunity” 
it is helpful to examine the conceptual difference between a defense from liability and a defense 
from suit.
77
  Affirmative defenses generally come in the form of defenses from liability, i.e. a 
defense that admits to the elements that comprise the claim but desires to “justify, excuse, or 
mitigate the commission of the act.”78  By contrast, immunity, like that typically granted public 
officials, is designed to operate as a defense from suit before the merits of a case are reached.
79
   
It is interesting to note that public officials, such as police officers and prosecutors, are 
often afforded a “qualified,” but not complete, immunity for their actions.80  The doctrine of 
qualified immunity grants protection to public officials from “liability for civil damages insofar 
                                                          
75
 See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (noting that legislators are privileged and immune from 
arrest or civil process while performing legislative duty); Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial 
Immunity, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 53 (2005) (discussing absolute and qualified prosecutorial immunity); Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (permitting qualified immunity to shield government officials from actions 
under § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 
a reasonable person would have known”).  As noted by the Supreme Court in Pearson v. Callahan, doctrines such as 
“qualified immunity” are intended to protect public officers from distraction, harassment, and liability while 
requiring them to remain accountable for the irresponsible exercise of power. 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); see also 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350 (2009) (recognizing that the doctrine of qualified immunity can shield officers 
form liability). 
76
 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.65.330 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
24.2 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West 2012); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 503.085 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.19 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
600.2922b (West 2012); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-15(5)(b) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.074 (West 2012); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:1-a (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51.2(e) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 
12.1-05-07.2 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.60(2)(B)(c) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 
1289.25 (West 2012); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8340.2 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-450 (2006); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-7-22(d) (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.62(2) (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-204 (West 
2012).    
77
 Qualified immunity, for example, is intended to operate before the merits of the case are reached.  Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 803, 818 (1982) (acknowledging that the purpose of qualified immunity is to “avoid excessive 
disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment”).  
Affirmative defenses, by contrast, are generally used to justify or excuse certain conduct.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 40–44. 
78
  People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553, 556 (Colo. 2011).    
79
 Maia R. Albrecht, Comment, Defining Qualified Immunity:  When is the Law “Clearly Established?”, 40 
WASHBURN L.J. 311, 318 (2001). 
80
 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 451 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”81  The doctrine exists to balance the public’s desire to 
hold officials accountable for their actions and the officials’ desire to be shielded from liability 
when they perform their duties in a reasonable manner.
82
  Qualified immunity acts as immunity 
from suit, not a defense to liability.
83
 
Though immunity provisions contained in, or related to, self-defense laws are relatively 
new, they are not a completely novel concept.  Prior to the outbreak of “Stand Your Ground” 
legislation featuring immunity provisions or statutes in 2005, a Colorado statute similarly 
granted immunity to persons defending their home.
84
  Enacted in 1985, Colorado statute section 
18-1-704.5 provides immunity from both civil and criminal prosecution to those utilizing force, 
including deadly force, in the face of an unlawful intruder.
85
  The statute’s purpose, as evident in 
its text, is to recognize the citizens’ “right to expect absolute safety within their own homes.”86  
This justification bears striking similarity to that for the Castle Doctrine.
87
  The Supreme Court 
of Colorado clarified, however, that this immunity was provided only when there is a known 
unlawful entry into the home.
88
  This requirement for unlawful entry makes the Colorado statute 
slightly more restrictive than the Castle Doctrine which provides a defense for the use of force in 
one’s home qualified only by the requirement that the individual is not the initial aggressor.89   
                                                          
81
 See id. 
82
 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
83
 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
84
 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704.5 (West 2012). 
85
 Id. 
86
 Id. 
87
 See supra text accompanying notes 55–62. 
88
 People v. McNeese, 892 P.2d 304, 313 (Colo. 1995). 
89
 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(1) (Official Draft 1985). 
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In 1987, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the language of the statute provided for 
more than just an affirmative defense to liability.
90
  The court held that the statute created the 
need for a pretrial determination of a defendant’s immunity from prosecution.91  In rendering 
their decision, the court looked at both the plain language of the statute, as well as the definition 
of immunity provided by Black’s Law Dictionary, and determined that the statute rendered any 
proceeding against an immune party improper.
92
  Procedurally, this required a pre-trial hearing at 
which the defendant was required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she 
was entitled to immunity under the statute.
93
  The pre-trial hearing was to be held 
contemporaneous with, or immediately following, the preliminary hearing.
94
  Specifically, this 
required the defendant to prove: 
(1) Another person made an unlawful entry into the defendant’s 
dwelling; (2) the defendant had a reasonable belief that such other 
person had committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the 
unvented entry, or was commiting [sic] or [intending] to commit a 
crime against a person or property in addition to the unvented 
entry; (3) the defendant reasonably believed that such other person 
might use physical force, no matter [how] slight, against any 
occupant of the dwelling; (4) the defendant used force against the 
person who actually made the unlawful entry into the dwelling.
95
   
 
                                                          
90
 People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 978 (Colo. 1987). 
91
 See id. 
92
 Id. at 975 
93
 Id. at 978. 
94
 Id.at 979 n.5. 
95
 Guenther, 740 P.2d at 981; see also Robert Christian Rutledge, Vigilant or Vigilante?  Procedure and Rationale 
for Immunity in Defense of Habitation and Defense of Property Under the Official Code of Georgia Annotated §§ 
16-3-23, -24, -24.1, and-24.2, 59 MERCER L. REV. 629, 652 (2008). 
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A defendant availing themselves to the pre-trial immunity proceeding is not later precluded from 
the assertion of self-defense as an affirmative defense at trial.
96
  Further, the decision by the court 
at the pre-trial is not considered a “final decision” subject to later appeal.97   
 While the Colorado courts interpreted their statute to provide for a pretrial determination 
of immunity, other courts interpreting similar language prior to 2005 declined to find the creation 
of an independent grant of immunity.
98
  Like Justice Holmes use of “immunity” in the Brown 
decision,
99
 other states have interpreted their statutes to provide for nothing more than the 
traditional affirmative defense.
100
  In Indiana, for example, the self-defense statute provided that 
no person would be placed in legal jeopardy for “protecting himself or his family by reasonable 
means necessary”101  The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the contention that this statute 
required a pretrial hearing to evaluate the legitimacy of a self-defense claim before subjecting a 
person to the “legal jeopardy” of a trial, holding instead that the language was a mere reflection 
of public policy of the state.
102
  Similarly, in Arizona, a statute originally enacted in 1970 stated, 
“[n]o person in this state shall be subject to civil liability for engaging in conduct otherwise 
justified pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.”103  The statute was challenged in Pfeil v. 
Smith, in which the defendant argued that her acquittal for justified conduct in a criminal charge 
was sufficient, under section 13-413 of the Arizona Code, to acquit her of subsequent civil 
                                                          
96
 See Wood v. People, 255 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Colo. 2011); Montanez v. State, 24 So.3d 799, 801 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2010 (noting that defendant would still be permitted to assert self-defense  even though he was denied 
immunity). 
97
 Id. 
98
 See, e.g., Loza v. State, 325 N.E.2d 173, 176 (Ind. 1975); Pfeil v. Smith, 900 P.2d 12, 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). 
99
 See supra text accompanying notes 69–71. 
100
 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-413 (2012). 
101
 See Loza v. State, 325 N.E.2d 173, 176 (Ind. 1975). 
102
 Id. The statute at issue in Loza has since been amended; however, the new legislation contains similar language.  
See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2(c) (West 2012) (“No person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any 
kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.”). 
103
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-413 (2012). 
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charges filed.
104
   The court, however, held that the statute did nothing more than to allow a 
person to assert the affirmative defense of self-defense in a civil case.
105
   
III. The Change in Self-Defense and the Addition of Immunity 
A. Florida:  Where it all began 
The movement towards broader self-defense legislation and immunity provisions began 
in Florida in 2005.
106
  Conceived of by former National Rifle Association (NRA) President 
Marion P. Hammer, Florida’s Protection of Persons Bill passed unanimously in the Senate and 
by overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives.
107
  It was promptly signed into law 
by Governor Jeb Bush on April 26, 2005
108
 and became effective October 1, 2005.
109
   Prior to 
2005, self-defense law in Florida combined statutory and common law and encompassed a duty 
to retreat.
110
  Florida’s self-defense statute 776.012 permitted the use of force if the defendant 
reasonably believed they faced imminent death or great bodily harm.
111
  Criminal prosecution 
prior to the new legislation permitted a person charged with a crime involving force, including 
homicide, to raise an affirmative defense of self-defense, but it did not provide for a pre-trial 
determination of that defense.
112
  A prima facie case of self-defense under the old self-defense 
statute consisted of: (1) a reasonable belief (2) that deadly force was necessary to prevent 
imminent death (3) to himself or herself (4) or another (5) or to prevent the imminent 
                                                          
104
 Pfeil v. Smith, 900 P.2d 12, 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). 
105
 Id. at 15.  
106
 Ross, supra note 10, at 18. 
107
 See Daniel Michael, Recent Development:  Florida’s Protection of Persons Bill, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 199, 199; 
Manuel Roig-Franzia, Florida Gun Law to Expand Leeway for Self-Defense, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/25/AR2005042501553.html. 
108
 Zachary Weaver, Note, “Stand Your Ground” Law:  The Actual Effects and the Need for Clarification, 63 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 395, 395. 
109
 See Michael, supra note 107, at 200. 
110
 Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999). 
111
 Hernandez v. State, 842 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2003) (“Section 776.012, Florida 
Statutes (1997), permits the use of deadly force against another, ‘only if he or she reasonably believes that such 
force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself.’ Whether a person was 
justified in using deadly force is a question of fact for the jury to decide if the facts are disputed.”). 
112
 See generally Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1049 (articulating Florida self-defense law in 1999). 
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commission of a felony.
113
  Once a defendant proved a prima facie case of self-defense, the 
burden shifted at trial to the state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did not 
act in self-defense.
114
  The jury was left with the ultimate decision, to determine whether the 
defendant subjectively held a belief and whether such a belief was objectively reasonable.
115
   
The 2005 “Stand Your Ground” law substantially amended Florida’s pre-existing statutes 
by eliminating the duty to retreat,
116
 establishing a presumption that force was used reasonably 
when faced with an unlawful intruder in the home or occupied vehicle,
117
 and expanding the 
right of an individual to use force, including deadly force, without the possibility of criminal or 
civil consequences.
118
  With respect to this last aspect, immunity,  the law stated:   “A person 
who uses force as permitted in § 776.012,  § 776.013, or § 776.031 is justified in using such 
force and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action . . . ."
119
  It further defined the 
term criminal prosecution to include “arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or 
prosecuting the defendant.”120   
Most provocatively, the new law prohibits arrest until there is probable cause to support 
the belief that the use of force was unlawful.
121
  In describing the dramatic change to self-defense 
law, the Florida Supreme Court in Dennis v. State stated: 
                                                          
113
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (2004). 
114
 Rasley v. State, 878 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
115
 Quaggin v. State, 752 So.2d 19, 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
116
 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2012). 
117
 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2012). 
118
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012). 
119
 Id; see also id. at § 776.012 (Use of force in defense of person); Id. at § 776.013 (Home protection; use of deadly 
force; presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm); Id. at § 776.031 (Use of force in defense of others). 
120
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012). 
121
 FLA STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012) (“A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for 
investigating the use of force as described in subsection (1), but the agency may not arrest the person for using force 
unless it determines that there is probable cause that the force that was used is unlawful).  Thus, ruling out self-
defense becomes part of the statutory requirement for a law enforcement officer to sign a complaint.  See Bartlett v. 
State, 993 So. 2d 157, 159–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
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While Florida law has long recognized that a defendant may argue 
as an affirmative defense at trial that his or her use of force was 
legally justified, section 776.032 contemplates that a defendant 
who establishes entitlement to the statutory immunity will not be 
subjected to trial . . . The statute does not merely provide that a 
defendant cannot be convicted as a result of legally justified 
force.
122
  
The Florida legislature was the first to pass a comprehensive update of its self-defense law 
pursuant to NRA lobbying, but they were most certainly not the last.
123
  
B. The Followers 
Due to the success of the legislation in Florida, the NRA increased its efforts to have 
similar legislation passed across the country.
124
  Since 2005, more than half of the states have 
enacted or considered similar legislation to Florida.
125
  This Comment specifically focuses on 
those containing provisions granting the accused immunity from civil and/or criminal liability for 
justified use of force.   
1. Criminal and Civil Immunity:  Florida and its Followers 
At least five states have enacted statutes which include immunity provisions having the 
same language as Florida, including:  Alabama, Oklahoma, Kansas, Kentucky, and South 
Carolina.
126
  North Carolina enacted a statute containing substantially similar language to 
Florida’s legislation; however, it does not contain a section specifically prohibiting an officer 
                                                          
122
 Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010). 
123
 Ross, supra note 10, at 16–17. 
124
 Michelle Jaffe, Up in Arms Over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law, 30 NOVA L. REV. 155, 178 (2005–
2006) (“Because the law passed in Florida so emphatically, the NRA plans to ride their ‘big tailwind’ and get similar 
laws passed across the nation.”).  NRA Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre stated that this was the “first step 
of a multi-state strategy.” Roig-Franzia, supra note 107, at A1.  He stated further, “We start with the red and move 
to the blue.” Michelle Cottle, Shoot First, Regret Legislation Later, TIME, May 2005, at 80, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1056283-1,00.html. 
125
 See Ross, supra note 10, at 2.  
126
 See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(d)-(e) (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
503.085 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51.2(e) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (West 
2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-450 (2006). 
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from arresting an individual without probable cause that the force used was unlawful.
127
  These 
statutes broadly immunize a defendant from both criminal and civil liability.
128
  Other states have 
adopted statutes with different language, though their effects will likely be similar.
129
  For 
example, the statute enacted in Georgia provides that a person “shall be immune from criminal 
prosecution” for lawful use of force, but it does not provide the same immunity from civil 
liability.
130
  
Not all of these statutes have been interpreted by their respective state courts; however, 
the supreme courts of at least three states have acknowledged that the statute provides for a pre-
trial immunity hearing.
131
  For example, the Florida Supreme Court in Dennis v. State held that 
the “plain language of section 776.032 grants defendants a substantive right to assert immunity 
from prosecution and to avoid being subjected to a trial.”132  This right, though similar to the 
pretrial immunity determination granted to residents of Colorado,
133
 is potentially more 
encompassing as it applies to self-defense claims as well as defenses of habitation.
134
  This pre-
trial determination grants immunity to a defendant that is substantially similar to that provided 
public officials because it reflects the notion that any further procedure against an “immune” 
party would be improper.
135
  Interestingly, Kansas has addressed the state’s immunity provision 
under a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
136
  In McCracken v. Kohl, the defendant alleged that 
                                                          
127
 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(e) (2011)., 
128
 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(d)-(e) (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 503.085 (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (West 2012). 
129
 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.65.330 (West 2012) (stating that a person is “not liable for the death of or injury 
to” a person against whom they have utilized lawful force); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (West 2012) (immunizing a 
defendant from criminal prosecution for force used in self-defense and defense of habitation). 
130
 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (West 2012). 
131
 See Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227, 230 (Ga. 2008); Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740, 755 (Ky. 2009); 
Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010). 
132
 Dennis, 51 So.3d at 462. 
133
 See supra text accompanying notes 90–97. 
134
 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012). 
135
 See supra text accompanying notes 74–83. 
136
 McCracken v. Kohl, 191 P.3d 313, 313 (Kan. 2008) 
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he was immune from the underlying battery prosecution and, thus, was unlawfully detained.
137
  
Though the court rejected the defendant’s argument, finding that his use of force was unjustified, 
the defendant’s argument furthers the notion that this new construct of immunity is one more 
akin to a defense to suit than a defense of liability.
138
   
C. Civil Immunity 
Since 2005, approximately thirteen states have enacted statutes providing for civil 
immunity for those who utilize force lawfully.
139
  Though the language of these statutes is not 
entirely consistent, most of these statutes exist as stand-alone grants of immunity from civil 
action.
140
  Idaho, for example, entitles their statute section 6-808 “Civil immunity for self-
defense.”141  Similarly, Tennessee entitles their statute “Use of force; civil immunity; costs and 
fees.”142  Texas entitles their section 83.001 simply “Civil Immunity.”143  These titles seem to 
reflect the notion that they provide some form of immunity greater than the affirmative defense 
traditionally offered defendants faced with claims of civil liability.  Unfortunately, judicial 
interpretation of the function of these statutes is limited.  Although it seems safe to assume that 
they function to prevent the assertion of claims against a defendant justified in his/her use of 
                                                          
137
 Id.  
138
 Id. at 319–20; see also supra text accompanying notes 74–83. 
139
 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.19 (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
600.2922b (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(5)(b) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.074 (West 2012); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:1-a (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07.2 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2307.60(2)(B)(c) (West 2011); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8340.2 (West 2012); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-11-622 
(West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-22(d) (West 
2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.62(2) (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-204 (West 2012).   At the time of this 
writing, proposed legislation in New Hampshire seeks to remove the civil immunity provision from the state statute.  
H.B. 135, 163rd Leg., Sess. of the General Court (N.H. 2013).   
140
 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. 
& REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012). 
141
 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012). 
142
 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012). 
143
 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012). 
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force the same way that immunity in the criminal setting protects a defendant from arrest, 
detention, charging, and prosecution
144
 this has yet to be conclusively decided by the courts. 
IV. Problematic Aspects of Immunity in the Criminal Context 
 
The states providing for immunity from criminal prosecution generally include arresting, 
detaining, charging, and prosecuting in the definition of prosecution.
145
  Such a broad definition 
necessarily implicates the actions of government actors in all phases of the criminal justice 
process.  This section examines the problematic aspects of the law with respect to each aspect of 
the “prosecution” from which a person becomes immune if they use force lawfully.   
A. Problems for Law Enforcement 
 
The Florida statute, and those similar, includes “arrest” and “detaining in custody" in the 
definition of prosecution from which a defendant is immune.
146
  The statutes go further to 
specifically prohibit law enforcement from initiating an arrest until probable cause is established 
that force was not used lawfully, i.e. in self-defense, defense of others, or defense of home.
147
  
While probable cause is the constitutional standard by which police effectuate a lawful arrest,
148
 
the law now requires that law enforcement obtain not only probable cause that a crime has 
occurred, but probable cause that refutes the person’s probable affirmative defense.149  
Therefore, a law enforcement officer, in the earliest stages of criminal prosecution, is tasked with 
                                                          
144
 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1). 
145
 Id. 
146
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012).  The Oklahoma statute, however, includes only charging and 
prosecuting in the definition of “criminal prosecution.”  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1289.25F (West 2012).  
Interestingly, it does include the same requirement that a law enforcement agency refrain from arrest until it 
determines that probable cause exists to prove the force used was unlawful.  See id. at § 1289.25G. 
147
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012).  
148
 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause"); Beck v. Ohio, 
379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (stating that, in the absence of a search warrant, "whether [an] arrest [is] constitutionally 
valid depends . . . upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officer[] had probable cause to make it"). 
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 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012) (Immunity from criminal prosecution and civil action for justifiable use 
of force). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2012) (use of force in defense of person). 
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evaluating the affirmative defense of the accused on scene if they desire to arrest the 
individual.
150
   
1. The Potential for Inconsistency and Abuse 
Due to the lack of legislative clarity regarding the application of the immunity statute, 
there is a great potential for inconsistent application of, and possible abuse of, this statute by law 
enforcement.
151
  Notably, the law received significant opposition from the law enforcement 
community prior to its original passage in Florida.
152
  Several urban police chiefs spoke out 
against the law calling it “unnecessary and dangerous” and publicly opposing its passage.153   
With respect to its application, no statute provides clear instructions as to the required 
procedures.  Section two of the Florida self-defense law,
154
 for example, permits law 
enforcement to use “standard investigative procedures” to determine the existence of probable 
cause;
155
 however, it does not clearly establish what those procedures entail for law enforcement 
agencies across the state.
156
  The Eleventh Circuit in Reagan v. Mallory recognized this lack of 
clarity stating, “[u]nder Florida law, law enforcement officers have a duty to assess the validity 
of this defense, but they are provided minimal, if any, guidance on how to make this 
                                                          
150
 See Elizabeth B. Megale, Deadly Combinations:  How Self-Defense Laws Pairing Immunity with a Presumption 
of Fear Allow Criminals to “Get Away with Murder,” 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 105, 130 (2010). 
151
 Id. at 119. 
152
 See Abby Goodnough, Florida Expands Right to Use Deadly Force in Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, 
at A18, available at, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/27/national/27shoot.html?_r=0. 
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 Id. 
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 FLA STAT. § 776.032(2) (West 2012).  In the Alabama, Oklahoma, Kansas, Kentucky, and South Carolina 
statutes this same language is reflected in the following subsections:  ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(e) (2012); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25G (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231(b) (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
503.085(2) (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-450(B) (West 2006). 
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 FLA STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012).   
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assessment.”157  While it may be true that law enforcement agencies receive training in arrest 
procedures, the statute now requires them to evaluate more than just the existence of a crime.
158
  
They are charged with both understanding the self-defense law and evaluating whether there is 
probable cause to believe that such a defense would fail.
159
  Law enforcement officers are not 
trained in this type of legal analysis.
160
   
Complicating the decision further is the requirement that the officer prove a negative.
161
  
The statute requires that police officers ascertain probable cause that “the force that was used is 
unlawful.”162  Therefore, not only must an officer have an understanding of the reasonableness 
and proportionality requirements that render use of force “unlawful” but they must have 
evidence supporting the absence of lawful use of force before they arrest.  Without probable 
cause proving that negative, law enforcement is prohibited from arresting.
163
  
Inconsistency is already evidenced by the incongruent treatment of factually similar cases 
in the state of Florida. While there is no relevant tracking system of law enforcement decision-
making in self-defense cases,
164
 much of the information demonstrating the effects of immunity 
from arrest can be deduced from the media.  Incidents that took place after the enactment of the 
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“Stand Your Ground” law, provide some insight as to the impact of placing an immunity 
decision on law enforcement.  The case that has gained the most significant media attention is 
the aforementioned Trayvon Martin case.  Seventeen-year old Trayvon Martin was fatally shot 
while returning from the neighborhood convenience store.
165
  Martin was unarmed.
166
  George 
Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch leader, stated that he shot the boy in self-defense, and he was 
not immediately arrested.
167
  The local police chief reported that the delayed arrest was a result 
of the absence of probable cause to believe that Zimmerman had used the force unlawfully under 
the Florida law.
168
   
Comparing Zimmerman’s situation to the plight of Jimmy Ray Hair demonstrates the 
consequences of inconsistent application of the law.
169
  In Hair v. State, Hair and the victim, 
Charles Harper, were engaged in a verbal argument at a nightclub.
170
  As in the Trayvon Martin 
case, and many self-defense cases for that matter, the facts that follow are somewhat disputed.
171
  
Hair asserted that Harper reached into the vehicle, and the two began to struggle.
172
  Hair then 
pulled out his gun and fired a shot at Harper.
173
  The police not only arrested Harper, but he sat 
for two years in jail awaiting a trial on a charge of first degree murder before eventually being 
granted immunity under Florida statute 776.032.
174
   
This lack of clarity could even lead to abuse, whether intentional or unintentional, by law 
enforcement.
175
  Officers draw their own subjective conclusions from a situation.  If, for 
                                                          
165
 Dahl, supra note 1. 
166
 Id. 
167
 Timeline, supra note 2. 
168
 Dahl, supra note 1. 
169
 See, e.g., Hair v. State, 17 So. 3d 804, 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).   
170
 Id. at 806. 
171
 Id. at 805; see also Megale, supra note 150, at 105. 
172
 Hair, 17 So. 3d at 805. 
173
 Id. 
174
 Megale, supra note 150, at 105. 
175
 See id.   
24 
 
example, an officer feels that the individual “victim” in an altercation where the Castle Doctrine 
or self-defense is invoked “deserved” what was coming to him, the officer may decline to arrest 
or to thoroughly investigate the incident.
176
  Normally, an officer would be required to arrest if 
probable cause exists that the crime occurred, regardless of their subjective assessment of the 
situation, and the existence of a victim would likely permit them to effectuate that arrest.
177
  With 
immunity, however, a single officer has the ability to decline to arrest, and this decision could 
potentially be influenced by his or her own subjective assessment of the situation.
178
  By 
contrast, if the issue of self-defense were to reach trial, the persuasiveness of the perpetrators 
claim of self-defense would be assessed by a jury
179
 comprised of a cross-section of the 
community.
180
  Thus, permitting a single officer to render a decision regarding a potential 
defendant’s immunity detracts from the benefits of both the multiplicity and the diversity of the 
decision-maker that is embodied in jury trials.
181
   
This possibility for abuse is highlighted in a story reported in Clearwater, Florida.
182
  
Kenneth Allen, a retired police officer, and his neighbor, Jason Rosenbloom argued on prior 
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occasions due to Rosenbloom’s failure to follow local codes.183  On the day of the incident, Allen 
heard loud music coming from Rosenbloom’s house,184 Rosenbloom came to his door and began 
threatening to make Allen’s life miserable.185  Allen closed the door and got a pistol from 
nearby.
186
  Rosenbloom refused to leave and began to rush into the house.
187
  Allen fired a 
shot.
188
  Police never arrested Allen who claimed that he was trying to stop a potential “home 
invasion,” and to “keep his house safe.”189  Among the possible foundations for the decision not 
to arrest may be the fact Allen was a retired police officer.  This type of inconsistency and abuse 
is severely problematic.  
2. Law Enforcement as the Prosecutor, Judge, and Jury  
In granting immunity from arrest and detention, Florida statute section 776.032, and 
those with similar language, make law enforcement personnel the initial arbiter in deciding 
whether a person is exercising a valid self-defense claim.
190
  If a prosecutor decides not to pursue 
the cases in which police decline to investigate, law enforcement officers become the ultimate 
decision-makers regarding whether or not a case is adjudicated.
191
  This effectively removes the 
determination of the perpetrator’s innocence or guilt from the court.192  This was recognized by 
the Eleventh Circuit in Reagan v. Mallory, evaluating Florida’s self-defense law.193   The court 
stated that by defining criminal prosecution so broadly, the statute “allows for an immunity 
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determination at any stage of the proceeding.”194  Therefore, a decision by law enforcement at 
the earliest stage of the proceedings bars potentially meritorious claims from evaluation by an 
objective judge or jury. 
Most concerning is the fact that law enforcement must make this decision without the 
benefit of the same extent of evidence normally presented to the trier of fact.  In many of the 
situations in which law enforcement officers must now apply the standard, all of the necessary 
evidence is in the hands of the defendant.
195
  In the Trayvon Martin case, for example, the victim 
against whom the force was used was no longer available to give his account of the 
altercation.
196
 The only remaining evidence with which law enforcement could establish 
probable cause would need to come from the very person asserting the defense, Zimmerman.  It 
is highly unlikely that Zimmerman would say or do anything to undermine his own asserted self-
defense, and his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination would allow him to 
remain silent.
197
  Therefore, arrest needed to wait.  In fact, Zimmerman’s assertion of self-
defense was enough to prevent the police from arresting him for several months.
198
  Even if 
witnesses were available to deliver their interpretation of the altercation, the police would then 
be required to assess the reliability of an individual’s testimony or recounting of the events, a 
role typically left to the jury or the trier of fact.
199
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Further, during the time between the incident and the arrest, assuming the two are not 
contemporaneous because the police cannot establish the requisite probable cause, the defendant 
would be permitted to live amongst the general population.
200
  This seems contrary to the 
purported goal of the legislation to allow “law-abiding people to protect themselves.”201  This 
potentially places a law-breaking citizen in the position to threaten the life or body of another 
law-abiding citizen.  It also provides the defendant with an opportunity for escape.  The purpose 
of arrest, and subsequent detention, of an individual, is not only to prevent harm to the 
community, but to assure that they are made available for later proceedings.
202
  The possibility 
for escape is exemplified in the Trayvon Martin case.  George Zimmeman’s whereabouts in the 
weeks following the incident were reportedly unknown.
203
  The attorney representing Martin’s 
parents expressed concern that even if the State of Florida decided to file charges against 
Zimmerman, he would be unavailable to face them.
204
  He stated, “[w]e’re concerned that he 
might be a flight risk, that nobody knows where he’s at.”205  While police indicated that they 
were in contact with Zimmerman, there was speculation that Zimmerman had left the jurisdiction 
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of Florida.
206
  Zimmerman was eventually charged and taken into custody on April 11, 2012, and 
he was ultimately acquitted on July 13, 2013.
207
 
B. Problems for Prosecutors and Judges 
 
The states granting immunity in the criminal context not only provide immunization from 
arrest but also from charging and prosecution.
208
  This necessarily implicates and alters the role 
of prosecutors and judges in the criminal justice process.
209
  Because prosecutorial decisions are 
not subject to review by the court, however, it would be difficult to identify precisely how a 
defendant’s assertion of self-defense affected prosecutorial decision-making prior to the 
enactment of such legislation.
210
  After its enactment, one prosecutor stated that “the real impact 
[of the law] has been that it’s making filing decisions for prosecutors.  It’s causing cases to not 
be filed at all or to be filed with reduced charges.”211  While this statement is difficult to 
substantiate because statistics on the number of self-defense claims made are unavailable,
212
 it 
demonstrates at the very least that some prosecutors are concerned with the law’s effect on 
charging decisions.  In Duval County, Florida, the State Attorney indicates that the law has 
influenced the office’s decision to charge or reduce charges in a handful of cases.213  
Specifically, he cited his office’s decision not to charge electronics store owner Doug Freeman in 
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the shooting of an unarmed man, Vince Hudson, in May of 2006.
214
  State Attorney Harry 
Shorstein, though publicly siding with the wounded individual, declined to prosecute stating that 
he did not believe he could get a conviction.
215
  Similarly, Florida State Attorney Andy Slater 
cited the “Stand Your Ground” law, as well as conflicting witness testimony, as the reasons he 
offered a defendant that stabbed a man at a party a particular plea agreement.
216
  
With the imposition of pre-trial hearings on immunity, judges are also given an additional 
task in the criminal justice process. 
217
  For example, the Florida Supreme Court in Dennis v. 
State adopted the pretrial immunity procedure articulated by the First District Court of Appeals 
in Peterson.
218
  The Peterson court largely followed the Colorado court in People .v Guenther 
and held that the defendant raising an immunity claim has the burden of establishing the factual 
prerequisites by a preponderance of the evidence.
219
  Therefore, a judge hearing a case in which 
the defendant asserts immunity under the “Stand Your Ground” legislation must evaluate the 
defendant’s immunity claim utilizing a preponderance of the evidence standard, prior to trial.  
These additional hearings also constitute an addition to the judge’s caseload that would not 
otherwise exist in a jurisdiction in which a defendant is permitted to only assert an affirmative 
defense of self-defense.
220
  By requiring additional hearings,
221
 these legislative hearings may 
undermine judicial economy.   
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V. The Problematic Aspects of  Immunity in the Civil Context 
An increasingly large number of states have established provisions to allow for a 
defendant’s immunity from civil liability if force is used lawfully.222  Though there is not yet 
substantial judicial interpretation, a careful analysis reveals a number of potential problems.  
Specifically, the laws do not distinguish between liability for injury to the unlawful 
aggressor and liability for injury to a third party.
223
  In fact, North Dakota is among the minority 
of these states that permits immunity from civil liability but recognizes an exception for “other 
persons . . . at risk of injury due to negligence or recklessness during use of force, then civil 
immunity would not apply to such third persons.”224  In statutes that do not carve out this 
particular exception, a person justified in utilizing force may not be held liable for injuries that 
result to a third-party.
225
  Such a situation was exemplified in Miami-Dade County, Florida in 
2006.
226
  As a nine-year old girl sat outside her home playing with her dolls, she was shot in the 
crossfire between two men, both of whom asserted a claim of self-defense.
227
  If both are 
successful in a claim of immunity, this eliminates any legal remedy, either civil or criminal, for 
the innocent girl.
228
  Under the Florida statute, a deadly defense may be justified, even if it was 
executed negligently or recklessly.
229
 
Though criminal and civil self-defense cases involving the same defendant are rare, the 
availability of a civil remedy has afforded some individuals or their families a remedy when the 
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criminal justice system did not.
230
  Perhaps the most famous example of this is in the self-defense 
context is the case of Bernhard Goetz.
231
  In Goetz, Bernhard Goetz boarded a subway train at 
Fourteenth Street in Manhattan and sat down in the same car as four youths.
232
  In his possession 
was an unlicensed .38 caliber pistol.
233
  One of the youths approached Goetz and stated “give me 
five dollars.”234  None of the juveniles displayed a weapon.235  Goetz responded by firing four 
shots at each of the four boys.
236
  One youth was struck in the chest, another in the back, the third 
in his left side, and the fourth was initially unscathed.
237
  Goetz then turned to the fourth youth 
and stated, “you seem to be all right, here’s another.”238  He fired a fifth bullet at the fourth 
youth, severing his spinal cord.
239
  Goetz fled immediately following the incident.
240
  However, 
nine days later Goetz surrendered himself to police.
241
  Goetz was eventually indicted for 
attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, and criminal possession of a weapon.
242
  
Goetz argued that his actions were justified as self-defense.
243
  New York self-defense law at the 
time of the incident provided that the use of force was justified when a person “believed deadly 
force was necessary to avert the imminent use of deadly force or the commission” of an 
enumerated felony and, if the District Attorney did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
                                                          
230
 See Forell, supra note 33, at 1406. 
231
 Id.  at 1407. 
232
 People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986). 
233
 Id. at 43 
234
 Id. 
235
 Id. 
236
 Id. 
237
 Id. at 43, 44. 
238
 Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 44. 
239
 Id.  
240
 Id. 
241
 Id. 
242
 Id. at 45.  There were a series of indictments and dismissals before these charges were solidified.  Id. 
243
 Id. at 46–47 (discussing New York self-defense law). 
32 
 
or she did not have such beliefs, the jury would determine if a reasonable person could have had 
such beliefs.”244   
On June 16, 1986, a jury acquitted Goetz of attempted murder, assault, and reckless 
endangerment.
245
  He was convicted only of one count of illegal weapons possession, a relatively 
minor felony for which he could face a maximum of seven years confinement.
246
  Despite this 
acquittal, Goetz was later subject to civil suit.
247
  Darryl Cabey, the fourth youth who suffered 
from a severed spinal cord as a result of the shooting, filed a $50 million civil suit in the Bronx 
Supreme Court alleging that the shots taken at his back were made “deliberately, willfully, and 
with malice.”248  Cabey prevailed in this later civil suit in 1996, receiving a $43 million judgment 
in his favor.
249
  With the enactment of provisions providing civil immunity, however, such civil 
suits may no longer be filed.  This would result in the denial of a remedy to a person who might 
otherwise be granted damages.   
VI. Recommendations:  The Need for Change or Clarification 
The most effective avenue for change is to advocate for administrative change or 
amendments to the existing laws to promote uniformity and to reduce the problematic 
application highlighted in the previous sections.
250
  The following details those 
recommendations. 
A. Florida Legislature Should Remove “Arrest” and “Detaining in Custody” from the 
Definition of Criminal Prosecution:  Legislative Recommendation 
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The legislature should remove the immunity decision from the purview of the law 
enforcement decision-making by eliminating “arrest” and “detaining in custody” from the 
definition of criminal prosecution in the statute.  These are the areas in which the greatest 
potential implementation problems exist.
251
  Overall, the calculation of reasonable force should 
not be within the scope and duties of law enforcement.  Law enforcement training in arrest 
procedures does not provide the necessary foundation for the complex legal analysis associated 
with assessing an individual’s unlawful use of force.252  Further, placing this responsibility on the 
shoulders of law enforcement makes them the initial, and possibly final, decision-maker though 
they are not equipped with the same volume of evidence that may be available later in the 
prosecution.  This aspect of the immunity provision also runs the risk of allowing the subjective 
beliefs of an officer to prevent the prosecution of a guilty party. 
With these removed, criminal prosecution would include charging and prosecuting the 
defendant.
253
  This would place the decision largely in the hand of the prosecutor and reduce the 
discretion of law enforcement in arrest decisions to the more common requirement of probable 
cause that the crime has occurred.  Allowing “charging” and “prosecution” to remain included in 
the definition of “criminal prosecution” does not carry the same inherent problems created by the 
inclusion of “arrest” and “detention.”  Providing immunity to criminal defendants simply adds to 
the considerations a prosecutor may need to make in deciding whether to charge or what crime to 
charge a particular defendant with.   
The only other impact is the addition of a requirement for pre-trial determinations of 
immunity, if the court interprets the statute to function like the courts in Dennis v. State and 
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People v. Guenther.
254
  Though such proceedings alter the common notion of self-defense as an 
affirmative defense asserted at trial, they seem to function like additional pre-trial summary 
judgment proceedings with likely insubstantial effect.  This amendment would still allow the 
statute to further the legislative goal in enactment, elimination of the fear of prosecution, because 
charges could be dismissed prior to trial and the assertion of an affirmative defense.  In this way, 
the defendant would not be subject to complete criminal prosecution. 
B. Alternatively, the State Should Require Law Enforcement to Report Investigative 
Procedures Regarding Self-Defense Claims:  Administrative Recommendation 
 
Law enforcement should be required to report the assertion of self-defense claims in 
order for an adequate assessment of the effects of these laws to be conducted, particularly the 
effects of the provision of immunity from arrest.
255
  Requiring law enforcement to track the 
manner in which they investigate and to log the cases that they decline to arrest would provide 
greater clarity regarding the effects of the law.  Based upon the data collected, it may be possible 
to create a uniform procedure for assessing probable cause in self-defense claims.  In order to 
create such a standard, law enforcement officers should be required to report all instances in 
which they decline to arrest based upon their evaluation of probable cause in a case of self-
defense.  This reporting should be done to their own agency.  This data would then be compiled 
across the state and evaluated to examine the various practices of law enforcement and their 
differing interpretations of what the law requires of them.  From this compilation the 
administration would need to create usable standard for law enforcement officers investigating 
assertions of self-defense. 
In conjunction with a usable standard, all law enforcement officers should be required to 
undergo additional training regarding the new self-defense law.  This training would provide 
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greater knowledge of the intricacies of the “Stand Your Ground” law to allow proper 
implementation.  At the moment, the confusion surrounding the law makes it difficult for anyone 
to properly understand the situations in which the use of force is, in fact, considered lawful and 
justified.  Due to the enhanced role of law enforcement officers under these statutes, their 
understanding of the law is imperative. 
Further, prosecutors may also be required to report the cases in which they decline to 
charge or reduce charges based primarily upon the existence of the “Stand Your Ground” law.  
This would permit a more thorough understanding of the actual effects that the law has on 
prosecutorial decision-making.
256
 
VII. Conclusion 
As evidenced by highly-publicized cases such as that of Trayvon Martin, the inclusion of 
immunity from criminal and civil liability in recent legislation has significant and potentially 
dangerous consequences.  Particularly, the expansion of the role of law enforcement in many 
recent statutes provides both for inconsistent application of the statute and unwelcome results in 
its implementation.  While our criminal justice system seeks to promote justice, statutes making 
law enforcement the initial arbiter of a person’s guilt thwart that end by preventing a case from 
reaching its factual merits.  Based upon this assessment, law enforcement should be required to 
engage in uniform procedures or the law should be amended to remove law enforcement 
discretion in arrest.  All states considering similar legislation must refrain from including 
“immunity from arrest” in the statute’s construction. 
                                                          
 
